In 2000, Biehl et al. proposed a fault-based attack on elliptic curve cryptography. In this paper, we refined the fault attack method. An elliptic curve E is defined over prime field F p with base point P ∈ E F p . Applying the fault attack on these curves, the discrete logarithm on the curve can be computed in subexponential time of L p 1/2, 1 o 1 . The runtime bound relies on heuristics conjecture about smooth numbers similar to the ones used by Lenstra, 1987. 
Introduction
In 1996, a fault analysis attack was introduced by Boneh et al. 1 . Biehl et al. 2 proposed the first fault-based attack on elliptic curve cryptography 3, 4 . Their basic idea is to change the input points, elliptic curve parameters, or the base field in order to perform the operations in a weaker group where solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ECDLP is feasible. A basic assumption for this attack is that one of the two parameters of the governing elliptic curve equation is not involved for point operations formulas. In this way, the computation could be performed in a cryptographically less secure elliptic curve.
In 2 , it is claimed that the attacker can get the secret multiplier k with subexponential time, but the authors did not give the proof or even an outline of the proof. I find that this is not a trivial result. Since the distribution of the cardinality of elliptic curves over finite field F q is not uniform in the interval q 1 − 2 √ q, q 1 2 √ q .
In practice, in order to get a better function, the cryptosystem may be based on some special family of elliptic curve. Here, we assume that the fault attack is restricted on the following elliptic curve defined over prime field F p :
Journal of Applied Mathematics which is denoted by E A,B . In this paper, we prove that the attacker can get the secret multiplier k with subexponential time when the fault attack is restricted to the elliptic curve family of E A,B . It is noted that we can get a simpler proof when the fault attack is based on the general elliptic curves. In Section 2, the fault attack method is described in detail and some improvements of the fault attack are introduced. Firstly, we can control the order of the fault point in E A, B by a suitable choice of the random key d. On the other hand, some points in E A,B can be chosen as fault point to increase the probability of success of the fault attack.
Our analysis depends on the number of E A, B F p with B ∈ F p . In Section 3, we research the isomorphism classes of the elliptic curves expressed by form 1.1 . By Deuring 5 ,  we find that the density of E A, B F p with B ∈ F p in p 1 − 2 √ p, p 1 2 √ p is large enough to ensure our method success. The analysis of our method in this paper shows that the performance of the algorithm is largely determined by the density of numbers built up from small primes in the neighborhood of p 1 and the number of isomorphism classes of the elliptic curves which can be expressed by form 1.1 . If a reasonable conjecture concerning the density of smooth integers is assumed, then the following can be proved.
Suppose that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and c is a positive constant; let L x α, c denote exp c log x α log log x 1−α .
1.2
There is a function K :
Then, with a suitable choice of parameters, ECDLP in the family of elliptic curves 1.1 can be determined by the attacker with probability at least 1 − e −h within time K p M p , where M p O log p 11 and h is the number of times Algorithm 2 is applied.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the scalar multiplication algorithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and refine the fault attack method. In Section 3, we discuss the isomorphism class of elliptic curves expressed by form 1.1 . In Section 4, the efficiency of the attack algorithm is considered.
Preliminaries

Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
Let E A,B be an elliptic curve of form 1.1 defined over finite field F p with p / 2, 3 and P i : x i , y i ∈ E A,B F p , i 1, 2, 3, such that P 1 P 2 P 3 . The algorithm below is a description of the elliptic curve scalar multiplication ECSM on curves defined in its most common form: 
2.2
The fault attack is based on the fact that the curve coefficient B is not used in any of the addition formulas given above.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let E be an elliptic curve and P x P , y P ∈ E. Given Q x Q , y Q ∈ P , the discrete logarithm problem asks for the integer k such that Q kP .
If the order of the base point P does not contain at least a large prime factor, then it is possible to use an extension for ECC of the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm 6 to solve the ECDLP as presented in Algorithm 1. Let n be the order of the base point P with a prime factor n j−1
Without losing generality, we assume that the order of the base point P is a prime number which is large enough for practical cryptosystems.
Fault Attack
In this section, we consider the following EC ElGamal cryptosystem. Let E A,B be an elliptic curve of form 1.1 defined over a prime field F p . Given a point P x P , y P ∈ E A F p , we assume that Q x Q , y Q kP is the public key and 1 ≤ k < ord P the secret key of some user, where ord P denotes the order of the base point P .
Encryption: Input message m, choose 1 < d < ord P randomly, and return dP, x dQ m . Decryption: Input H, m , compute kH, and return m x kH .
The fault attack is that the attacker randomly chooses an elliptic curve E A, B defined over prime field F p , finds a point P x P , y P ∈ E A, B F p , and inputs d P, m to the decryption oracle, then the attacker can get the x-coordinate of kd P . Having x kd P , we compute y kd P by
In practice, we can compute E A, B and P ∈ E A, B F p as follows. Fix an element x P ∈ F p , for any y P ∈ F p , and define
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Journal of Applied Mathematics Input: E A and P x P , y P ∈ E A F p , Q x Q , y Q kP , w is a parameter to be chosen later and q is the order of point P . Output: Scalar k partially with a probability. 1 Randomly choose x P , y P ∈ F p .
1
Apply decryption oracle to compute x kd P .
3.1 y kd P ← x Let E A, B be an elliptic curve of form 1.1 as follows:
clearly P :
Having the points pair d P, kd P ∈ E A, B F p , one can obtain k mod n, where n ord d P . This would be possible if all the prime factors of E A, B F p are smaller than order of P . The complete attack procedure is presented as Algorithm 2. By repeating Algorithm 2, then applying CRT, we can get k from the congruences k mod n. The following lemma is useful for us to increase the efficiency of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 2.1. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over finite filed F q . Then,
with n 1 | n 2 and n 1 | q − 1.
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For giving an elliptic curve E A, B defined over finite field F p , we assume that E A, B F q Z n 1 × Z n 2 . Then there exists a point P such that ord P n 2 . The number of such points is n 1 φ n 2 , where φ · is the Euler function. Let n 2 n 2w n 2 , where n 2w is the product of all the prime factors of n 2 which are smaller than w. If, in Step 2.2 , we choose d satisfying n 2 | d and d, n 2w 1, then the order of d P is a w smooth integer. Certainly, of course, we can choose a point P in E A,B F p . The procedure of choosing such a point is similar as above.
The Isomorphism Classes
In this section, we count the number of isomorphism classes over F p of elliptic curves 1.1 defined over a prime field F p .
It is easy to see that the discriminant Δ and the j invariant of the formula 1. 
which is obtained by a theorem of Hasse. Let, conversely, p be a prime > 3 and let t be an integer satisfying |t| ≤ 2 √ p. Then, the weighted number of elliptic curves E over F p with E F p p 1 − t, up to isomorphism is given by a formula that is basically due to Deuring 5 ; see also 7-9 :
where H t 2 − 4p denotes the Kronecker class number of t 2 − 4p. For the Kronecker class number, the following result is useful. 
for all Δ ∈ Z with −z ≤ Δ < 0, Δ ≡ 0, or 1 mod 4, except that the left inequality may be invalid if Δ 0 Δ * , where Δ 0 is the fundamental discriminant associated with Δ.
In order to apply Algorithm 2, we divide F p into two parts S 
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.3 is similar to the proof of 1.9 in 10 ; for self-containdeness, we give it here. The left-hand side of the inequality equals , for p −→ ∞.
4.4
These arguments lead to the following conjectural running time estimation for solving the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curve of form 1.1 over prime field. 
